The Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, 1792-1815 by Owen Connelly

Author:Owen Connelly [Connelly, Owen]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, War
ISBN: 9780415239837
Google: zN4LRcapensC
Goodreads: 19596531
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2005-10-02T00:00:00+00:00

10

“THAT MISERABLE SPANISH AFFAIR”: THE PENINSULAR WAR, 1808–13

“That miserable Spanish affair [the Peninsular War] is what doomed me,” Napoleon told Las Cases in exile (1816) on St Helena.1 He blamed his “disasters” on the war in Spain and Portugal, and said it “opened a school for English [British] soldiers.”2 Indeed. Britain’s army in Portugal and Spain got experience under Arthur Wellesley, one of Napoleon’s few peers as a commander, who left Iberia as Duke of Wellington. He trained Portuguese troops also, and eventually commanded all troops in Spain and Portugal.

In Iberia, French armies sustained 300,000 casualties (some 260,000 French or foreigners in French service; 40,000 in the armies of Naples, Westphalia, and other allied states). Spanish resistance, especially guerrilla attacks, and the action of Wellington’s forces, surely put a strain on Napoleon’s troops. However, they were not demoralized; they fought well to the end if well commanded. Conscripts, however, were prone to desertion if assigned to Spain.3The French Empire poured 3,000 million francs in gold into the Peninsula, and many times that in arms, materiel, horses, etc. It weakened the Empire long before the Russian disaster (1812). The people’s resistance (or the perception of it) encouraged Napoleon’s enemies elsewhere.

Napoleon never fought Wellington in Iberia. (He was there only two and a half months, 4 November 1808 to 16 January 1809). He delegated command of French forces, but of course sent the commanders orders from Paris, with scant effect. The failure of Napoleon’s subordinates raises questions about how the whole marshalate were chosen, whether they were ever intended for independent command, and how new generals, some of whom appeared in 1813 and 1814, were or would be produced.

Napoleon himself never attempted to answer these questions, but said on St Helena: “My presence was indispensable anywhere I wanted to win a victory. It was a flaw in my armor: None of my generals had the force for a large independent command.”4

Napoleon’s decision not to command in person in Iberia raises questions about his judgment. However, the Peninsular War is of little use in analyzing his ability as a commander. This chapter will be brief.5

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